No serious offences were reported between the government and the armed movement or the 16 political parties that signed the agreement in August 2000.1 Three Tutsi parties – Independent Workers` Party, National Alliance for Rights and Development and Rally for Democracy and Economy and Social Development – were not signatories to the agreement on 20 September 2000.2 CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FLN did not sign the agreement. On 2 December 2002, the CNDD-FDD, the main Hutu party, signed a ceasefire agreement with the transitional government. In order to facilitate the return of refugees, in particular from Tanzania, UNHCR, Tanzania and the Burundian government reached an agreement on voluntary repatriation in early May 2001.3 In September, Burundian officials visited refugee camps in northwestern Tanzania.4 In 2001, the BMI addressed several issues and the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. In this context, a transitional agreement was reached on 25 July 2001.5 With regard to serious negotiations for a ceasefire with rebel groups, the BMI asked the transitional government to consider draft provisional amnesty laws for returning exiles; genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; and the creation of a national commission for the rehabilitation of refugees.6 v. Pending the negotiation and agreement of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement with the armed wings of the non-signatory parties, Chapter III of The Agreement`s Protocol III will not enter into force; following the ceasefire agreement, it is considered modified and compatible with its provisions. The agreement was ratified in 2002, but was not fully implemented until a protocol was signed by the main CNDD-FDD rebel group in 2003. During 2002, the IMC worked with the government on various laws, including freedom of action for political parties, provisional immunities, the law against genocide and the creation of a National Committee for Refugees and Siists (CNRS). Not all major parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During this three-year gap, implementation of civil administration reforms began. The agreement called for reforms aimed at depoliticising the civil service, reducing corruption and increasing skills. In 2001, the government conducted a census of public servants across the country.
In the February 2002 result, 40,642 people were employed in the public service, but the Department of Public Service had sent pay cheques to 41,642 people. Some 1,000 people who had been paid were not taken into account.1 In July 2002, Parliament passed a new law that allows unions to work for public servants.2 No initiative has been taken to achieve a balance between ethnic groups in the public service. The agreement provided for the creation of a technical committee composed of representatives of the Burundian armed forces, fighters from political parties and political movements and external military advisers. The transitional government was tasked with determining the size of the national defence forces, in consultation with the technical committee. According to the agreement, political, ethnic, regional and gender-based criteria would be used to determine defence force imbalances, but the new force would consist of 60% government army officers and 40% of the FDD. 1) Announcement of the cessation of hostilities 48 hours after the signing of the ceasefire agreement through command channels and print and electronic media; But why exactly are the Arusha agreements so central? To what extent does the CNDD-FDD have a historical connection to these agreements? And what impact will this have on the current crisis? Not all major parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003.