This paper examines the impact of reciprocal and non-reciprocal trade agreements on exports of trade agreements from developing countries to industrialized countries, using the most recent data and techniques available to estimate structural gravity and taking into account the direction of export flows of mutual agreements. The use of the data up to 2016 allows us to analyse whether non-reciprocal preferences have been eroded in recent years due to the many reciprocal trade agreements signed between developed and developing countries over the past decade. The sampling period also includes the revision of the European GSP in 2014, when several middle-income countries lost their preferential access to the European Union. In addition, in line with the results of , we are also examining the different potential effects of the two types of agreements on exports from industrialized countries to recipient countries. From an econometric point of view, we simultaneously control several sources of bias (concepts of multilateral resistance, unsuitable bilateral heterogeneity, heteroscid residue and zero trade flow), which is consistent with the current state of the art in the literature on the gravitational equation. So far, the comparison between reciprocal and non-reciprocal trade agreements has been based on PTAs. However, as has already been said before multilateral trade liberalization under the gaTT/WTO, this approach is also reciprocal. Empirical evidence of the impact of GATT/WTO in different groups of countries (developed towards development) is different (, , ,,  and ). Empirical results range from negative effects on developing countries to positive effects for both groups. Under the leadership of the United States and the United Kingdom, international cooperation has flourished and concrete institutions have been created. The discussions that began at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 were the International Monetary Fund. The first international trade agreement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was established in 1949. In 1994, THE GATT was replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO), which still controls international trade agreements.
  To provide an overview of our results, we find that the evidence provided varies according to specifications. However, according to our preferred specification, the PPML estimate, with the dependent variable in export shares, has had a positive impact on trade flows between developed and developing countries when the exporter is the developing country. For the data available up to 2008, data indicate that NRPA has positive effects on exports from recipient countries that have disappeared in recent years. Finally, our preferred specification for exports from industrialized countries to recipient countries does not produce a significant effect. In negotiating agreements under the RTAA, the United States has generally made direct concessions only to so-called primary suppliers – that is, countries that have been or are likely to become the main source or important source of the goods under discussion. The concessions were granted in exchange for opening foreign markets to U.S. exports. As more and more U.S.
industries began to benefit from tariff cuts, some of them began campaigning with Congress for lower tariffs. Until RTAA, Congress had been mainly pressured by industries that wanted to create or increase tariffs to protect their industry. This change has also helped to maintain many of the benefits of trade liberalization. In short, the political incentive to increase tariffs has diminished and the political incentive to reduce tariffs has increased.  For most countries, international trade is governed by unilateral trade barriers of different species, including tariffs, non-tariff barriers and absolute prohibitions.